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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. i 
LEIKINA LAVULAVU, 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
Case No. 970296-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE QF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction by a jury of 
Manslaughter in a School Zone, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann., Section 76-3-203.2 (Supp. 1994). A copy of the 
statute is attached as Addendum A. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann., Section 78-2-3 (2) (j). (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The Defendant contends that the trial court improperly denied 
the Defendant's motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained 
from the traffic stop of the vehicle the Defendant was driving 
during the early morning of the shooting on August 25, 1996. The 
Court "review[s] the factual findings underlying the trial court's 
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a 
clearly erroneous standard." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 n.4 
(Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Brown. 853 P.2d. 851, 854 (Utah 
1992)). Specifically, "whether a specific set of facts gives rise 
to reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable 
1 
nondeferentially for correctness . . . [with] a measure of 
discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a 
given set of facts." IsL. at 939 (R. 48-58, 208-16). 
Secondly, the trial court committed error in holding that the 
subsequent search of the vehicle was proper. As with all issues 
raised by a motion to suppress, a review of the factual issues 
underlying the trial court's decision are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard. State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 
1995). The trial court's legal conclusions based upon those facts 
are reviewed for correctness, according the trial court's 
conclusions no deference. State v. Yates, 918 P. 2d 136, 138) . 
(R. 48-58, 208-16). 
Third, the court committed error in admitting the statements 
attributed to the co-defendant Beau Heaps in the trial of the 
Defendant. Additionally, the trial court committed error in 
refusing to admit evidence relevant to the violent character of the 
victim. Generally, a court is granted broad discretion in its 
decision to admit or exclude evidence. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
938. The Court reviews evidentiary matters on an "abuse of 
discretion" basis. State v. Casias. 772 P. 2d 975, 977 (Utah App. 
1989). Legal determinations accompanying an interpretation of the 
rules of evidence are reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993) (R. 199-
203, 203-4). 
Fourth, based upon the Defendant's inability to converse and 
understand English, the trial court committed error in holding that 
2 
the Defendant had waived his Miranda rights and accordingly, the 
Defendant's statement to police was admissible. The appellate court 
reviews a trial court's legal conclusion of a valid waiver of his 
Miranda rights for correctness. However, the standard of review 
grants a measure of discretion to the trial court because of the 
variability of the factual settings, which are reversed only if 
clearly erroneous. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 941 (Utah 1994); 
StatR v. Leyva. 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 6 (Utah 1997) (R. 51-53). 
Fifth, the evidence submitted to the jury in this case was not 
sufficient to sustain the jury verdict. In reviewing a claim of 
insufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court views the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in a light 
most favorable to the verdict. State v. Wood, 868 P. 2d 70, 87 (Utah 
1993) . ' 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body or the appendix of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Leikina Lavulavu was charged by Information with 
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann., 
Section 76-5-203 (Supp. 1996). The Information alleged that the 
Defendant together with the co-defendant, Beau Heaps, on August 25, 
1996, "intentionally or knowingly caused the death of John Frietag 
or solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or aided another 
person to cause the death of John Frietag." The Information also 
3 
included reference to two enhancement penalties, one for the use of 
a firearm and the second, based upon the use of a firearm within 
1,000 feet of a school (R. 1-3). 
The Defendant was bound over to District Court after a 
preliminary hearing held on October 22, 1996. During that hearing, 
the Defendant's case was severed from the four co-defendants 
charged in the Information (R. 34-39) . 
Prior to the trial, Defendant filed several motions. The 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress based upon an illegal stop and 
search of a vehicle in which the Defendant was riding and the 
improper interrogation of the Defendant without properly advising 
him of his Miranda rights (R. 45-58). The Defendant also filed a 
motion challenging the constitutionality of the enhancement statute 
(R. 60-85) . Finally, the Defendant filed motions and responses as 
to the inadmissibility of statements allegedly made by co-
defendants and the admissibility of evidence relating to the 
character and disposition of the victim (R. 196-203) . Following a 
suppression hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant's motion 
to suppress addressing the issues of the legality of the traffic 
stop, the subsequent search of the defendants and vehicle and the 
sufficiency of the Miranda warnings given to the Defendant (R. 258-
65) . 
The jury trial of the Defendant began on December 2, 1996 and 
ended with a verdict on December 10, 1996. The jury found the 
Defendant guilty of the lesser included charge of Manslaughter, in 
a school zone(R. 412). On January 10, 1997, the trial court 
4 
sentenced the Defendant to be confined in the Utah State Prison for 
an indeterminate term of "five years for which could be fore life" 
(R. 464-65, 473-74) . 
The notice of appeal was filed on February 10, 1997 (R. 476). 
Defendant appeals from his conviction and seeks a new trial 
and directions concerning the admissibility of certain evidence and 
testimony. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as the Defendant claims that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury verdict, the facts are recited in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Morgan. 
865 P.2d 1377 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Mickelson. 848 P.2d 677 
(Utah App. 1992; £££ State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) . 
A. Events Prior to August 25, 1996. 
1. Officer Darcey Simmons of the Orem Police Department 
testified that he met with the victim, John Frietag on August 18, 
1996, at the Frietag residence located at 363 East 450 North, Orem 
Utah. At that time, Frietag played an answering machine tape for 
the Officer that he had received on that day (Tr. 1059-60, Ex. 1) . 
The tape contained threats but Mr. Frietag and Officer Simmons were 
unable to identify the individual making the calls, could not 
identify a Tongan accent and could not link the Defendant to the 
threats made on the tape (Tr. 1061) . Mr. Frietag called the Officer 
later that day to tell him that he had received another call in 
which threats were made (Tr. 1060) . 
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2. Tiana Heard was an acquaintance of the co-defendant Beau 
Heaps and at the time of trial, hated him. Ms. Heard only knew the 
Defendant as one of the individuals that Beau Heaps would 
occasionally bring to her house (Tr. 1061, 1066) . Ms. Heard 
testified that she was best friends with Mr. Frietag's 
stepdaughter, Susan Rice, and considered Mr. Frietag as the only 
father figure in her life. Accordingly, Tiana had been at the 
Frietag residence frequently (Tr. 1061) . Susan Rice was the girl 
friend of the co-defendant Beau Heaps. Ms. Heard testified 
regarding an occasion when the Frietag door was damaged that 
apparently was the source of friction between Heaps and Frietag 
(Tr. 1061-62) . Ms. Heard testified that the co-defendant Beau Heaps 
admitted to her, on or about August 11, 1996, that he had made the 
threats to Mr. Frietag on the answering machine when he was drunk 
(Tr. 1063, 1068, Ex. 1). The court allowed Tiana to testify that 
the Defendant talked to Mr. Frietag either when Mr. Frietag called 
back after receiving the threatening message or when the Defendant 
called him back directly. The conversation centered on whether Mr. 
Frietag was a "narc" (Tr. 1064) . Tiana testified that she heard the 
Defendant say that he would take care of "it" and testified that 
she saw the Defendant with a gun in his pants, which she identified 
as the gun matched to the shooting (Tr. 1064, Ex. 2). Tiana 
testifies that John Frietag, two or three days prior to the 
shooting, changed his hair color because he was looking for a new 
appearance and that "he was scared of some things" (Tr. 106 5, 
1067) . However, Mr. Frietag told his close friend Nancy Ann 
6 
Bollschweiler that he was not afraid of Beau Heaps (Tr. 1234) . 
Tiana testified that Frietag was not violent (Tr. 1066) , but 
acknowledged that he used marijuana almost every day (Tr. 1067) . In 
fact, Frietag provided marijuana to Ms. Heard (Tr. 1067) . 
3. On cross-examination, Tiana admitted that she had been 
drinking the night the conversation with Beau Heaps and the 
Defendant occurred regarding Mr. Frietag (Tr. 1068) . Further, she 
admitted that LSD and marijuana was being used and that she was 
sufficiently confused as to accuse others visiting her of stealing 
her possessions when she ultimately discovered them where she had 
placed them (Tr. 1068-69, 1478, 1519, 1582). Ms. Heard admitted 
that the "bad blood" was between the co-defendant Beau Heaps and 
John Frietag and that the Defendant was not involved (Tr. 1069). 
Tiana admitted that the Defendant made no threats against 
Mr. Frietag in the conversation he allegedly had with Mr. Frietag 
and that the Defendant did not discuss the conversation with her. 
Further Tiana admitted that at preliminary hearing, she could not 
remember anything about threats made by the Defendant (Tr. 1069-
70). She admitted that when she saw the gun in the Defendant's 
possession, she only saw a centimeter and one-half of the gun 
(Tr. 1070). Finally, Tiana admitted that she tried to get the co-
defendant Beau Heaps and the Defendant to beat up her ex-husband 
but that the crime never occurred (Tr. 1070). 
4. Tracy Todd Price testified that he was a friend of the 
Defendant and Mr. Frietag and that he saw the gun linked to the 
shooting in the possession of the Defendant and another gun in the 
7 
possession of the co-defendant Beau Heaps several nights before the 
shooting at a party (Tr. 1071, 1073). Price acknowledged that he 
was drunk that night and that the gun, from several feet away, only 
appeared to be the same gun (Tr. 1073, Ex. 2) . Price testified that 
during the early morning hours after the party had ended, he was 
being taken home because of his intoxication and that he saw the 
Defendant fire six shoots from the gun at parked vehicles. He 
testified that another individual, Bo Molupo then took the gun, 
reloaded it and shot at more parked cars (Tr. 1072-4) . The firing 
of the gun was denied by Bo Molupo and the defendant Niemeitolu 
(Tr. 1474, 1513). There were no police reports of shooting or 
broken windows between the times and at the location testified to 
by Price (Tr. 1523). Price testified that Mr. Frietag played the 
telephone threat he had received from the answering machine and 
that he recognized the voice as that of Beau Heaps (Tr. 1072) . 
Price acknowledged that Frietag drank and used marijuana 
(Tr. 1072). 
5. Margaret Ann Shepard testified that she knew the co-
defendant Beau Heaps and had been romantically involved with him 
(Tr. 1075) . She testified that she saw Heaps and the Defendant 
together three days before the incident and that once, while riding 
in a vehicle and once, when they had arrived at their destination, 
the co-defendant Beau Heaps said that he was going to kill Susan's 
father, Mr. Frietag. Ms. Shepard acknowledged that the Defendant 
was not part of the conversation and made no comment regarding the 
statements made by Heaps (Tr. 1075-6). Ms. Shepard acknowledged 
8 
that in the three weeks, prior to the incident, that she had known 
of the Defendant, he never commented about Mr. Frietag made any 
threats concerning him (Tr. 1077). Ms. Shepard also testified that 
the Defendant had a difficult time speaking and understanding 
English. In fact, the individuals that knew him recognized that 
Tongan was the language that the Defendant most often spoke. At the 
time of the traffic stop, when the Defendant was apprehended, the 
Defendant had misunderstood a police command to walk backward and 
had walked forward (Tr. 1078, 1421-22, 1425-26, 1518, 1582) . 
6. Todd L. Huffman and his wife, Donna Huffman, testified 
that they were neighbors of Frietag and that on week prior to the 
shooting, they had a conversation with Frietag in which he 
indicated that his daughter had received a threatening letter and 
that some of her friends, Tongans and a white male were dangerous 
and making threats (Tr. 1117-18, 1190-20). Frietag indicated that 
he was working with the Narcotics Enforcement Team, that they were 
going to provide him with a bulletproof vest and that they wanted 
him to lure the individuals to catch them with drugs (Tr. 1120) . 
The Thursday before the shooting, Mrs. Huffman testified that 
Mr. Frietag indicated that he was meeting with the "main guy" and 
that the problem was resolved (Tr. 1122). Frietag told his friend 
Nancy Ann Bollschweiler that his problem was with the co-defendant 
Beau Heaps over the broken door to his apartment (Tr. 123 0-31) . 
7. Susan Rice testified that Mr. Frietag was her mom's 
boyfriend for years but she had no biological relationship with him 
(Tr. 1565) . She testified that she dated the defendant Beau Heaps 
9 
and that he and John Frietag were friends initially during 1994 and 
1995. In 1996, Beau would go to the house to see Mr. Frietag 
without Susan and drink (Tr. 1566-67) . Susan related that the 
friction between the two was over the broken glass door during the 
summer of 1996 (Tr. 1567). Susan indicated that she never heard of 
any letter in which a threat to rape and kill her was made as 
Frietag had stated to neighbors (Tr. 1567). Susan testified to 
Mr. Frietag1s use of marijuana, alcohol and cocaine on a frequent 
basis (Tr. 1568) . She described, at the time of the shooting, mood 
swings that Mr. Frietag was experiencing that caused him to be 
paranoid (Tr. 1568) . Susan also testified that Mr. Frietag and 
Nancy Bollschweiler were romantically involved and that she had 
walked in on them in March of 1996 (Tr. 1568). Susan testified to 
threats of violence that Mr. Frietag made to defendant Heaps 
(Tr. 1570-72) and that Frietag was not afraid of Heaps (Tr. 1572). 
8. Susan McKeown, Susan's mother and John Frietag's girl 
friend from 1993 to 1996 confirmed the presence of mood swings when 
Mr. Frietag was doing drugs (Tr. 1573). She reported significant 
paranoia on his part when he would imagine stories in his head and 
then believe them to be true (Tr. 1573, 1575). Further Ms. McKeown 
confirmed that when John was doing drugs and alcohol, he was most 
violent (Tr. 1574-5) . At the time that Susan moved out, Mr. Frietag 
was depressed, curled up on a couch and crying (Tr. 1575) . 
9. Kimberly Nilsson was married to John Frietag from 1989 to 
1993 (Tr. 1659-60). She testified to a series of violent acts by 
Mr. Frietag that were sometimes accompanied by drinking (Tr. 1660-
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62, 1664-70) . She also testified as to Mr. Frietag's use of illegal 
drugs (Tr. 1662-64) . 
10. The Defendant's relative and religious leader testified 
that he had problems with comprehension in school. Lekina had 
problems retaining even simple information such as forgetting only 
two items he was sent to the store to purchase (Tr. 1586-87) . They 
testified that the Defendant was religious, nonviolent, excellent 
with kids and kind (Tr. 1585-89, 1600-04). 
B. Events of August 25, 1996. 
11. Anthony Tai, one of the seven individuals charged in the 
matter testified that he did not know John Frietag (Tr. 1387-88) . 
Tai testified that he had seen the Defendant with a gun days 
earlier with other defendants who had guns but was unsure if it was 
the gun linked to the shooting (Tr. 1426-27) . He testified that all 
of the defendants charged in the matter including Leikina Lavulavu 
were originally at the Branbury Apartments in Provo, Utah during 
the evening of Saturday, August 24, 1996. Thereafter the 
defendants, during the early morning hours of Sunday, August 25, 
1996, went to a home occupied by Apasi, where they partied and 
consumed significant amounts of beer (Tr. 1388-90) . Anthony 
testified that he had a case or two of beer to drink himself, was 
"pretty drunk" and had a "dim" memory of the night (Tr. 13 96, 
1422). Anthony testified that the co-defendant Beau Heaps 
apparently made a phone call from that residence that angered the 
Defendant Kina Lavulavu who was yelling at Heaps for making the 
call. Subsequently, a phone call came in and was answered by co-
ll 
defendant Tonga Mounga who passed the phone to defendant, David 
Niumeitolu. The individuals did not appear to be angry when they 
were talking on the phone, but Anthony testified that after the 
phone call, the seven individuals got up and got into the 
Defendant's car (Tr. 1390-93, 1424). At the time the phone call 
came in, the Defendant was playing the guitar (Tr. 1422). 
12. The Defendant, Tai and Nua Unga, testified that the 
Defendant was driving the vehicle but he saw no gun in the 
Defendants possession (Tr. 1393, 1581). Anthony testified that he 
remembers no conversation in the car but thought they were going to 
meet a girl (Tr. 1398, 14232). When they arrived in the area of the 
Frietag apartment, Anthony Tai testified that everyone exited the 
vehicle, except Niua Unga, and he followed them, walking, to the 
Frietag apartment during which time no threats were being made. He 
testified that he walked up to the door, as instructed by Beau 
Heaps, while three of the individuals went around the left side of 
the unit. The co-defendant Beau Heaps was hiding behind a car 
(Tr. 1400-03, 1424, Ex. 5) . The Defendant was back on the grass 
area (Tr. 1410) . Anthony was told by Heaps that he knew the guy at 
the apartment where the girl lived and, accordingly Anthony opened 
the screen door, rang the door bell and Frietag opened the door 
with his hands to his side, tensed. Anthony, after being coached by 
someone, asked if Susan was there and was told by Frietag that 
Susan was not home (Tr. 1404-07, 1429, Ex. 7, 9, 34). 
13. At that juncture, Bo Malupo, David Niemeitolu and Tonga 
Mounga, the three individuals that had gone around the house, 
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joined him at the front door (Tr. 1407-08) The Defendant Bo Malupo 
then said, "He's got a gun." Anthony, believing that Frietag could 
have had a gun and afraid, closed the screen door and walked away 
past the Defendant and Beau Heaps, leaving the other three 
individuals at the door (Tr. 1409-10, 1418-20, 1428-29) . Anthony 
then heard the Defendant say, "should I shoot him?" and a shot was 
fired from behind him (Tr. 1411-13). Anthony testified that he did 
not hear any conversation that existed on the Frietag tape about 
"cops" and does not know what Frietag did after he turned around 
(Tr. 1418) . The individuals than returned to the car and drove away 
(Tr. 1413-14) . Until the defendants were stopped Anthony testified 
that he did not see a gun or hear any conversation about a gun (Tr. 
1415) . I 
14. The defendant Bo Malupo, who had a case of beer to drink 
that night, the defendant, Tonga Mounga, who had a twelve pack to 
drink, defendant David Niumeitolu, who had two drinks, and Nua Unga 
confirmed the defendants' presence at a party outside of the 
Apasi's apartment during the early morning of August 25 at which 
the defendants were drinking and singing (Tr. 1436-37, 1441, 1483-
84, 1502, 1580) . Malupo testified that the Defendant was not a big 
drinker and had the least to drink that night (Tr. 1476). Mounga 
and Niumeitolu testified that he saw defendant Beau Heaps make a 
phone call that lasted minutes (Tr. 1484, 1503) They testified that 
he saw the defendant Beau Heaps answer the phone shortly before 
leaving the area and then hand the phone to defendant Tonga Mounga 
and defendant David Niumeitolu, where expletives were exchanged and 
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threats made by Frietag (Tr. 1438-39, 1484-85, 1503). Malupo and 
Niumeitolu testified that they talked to a person whom they didn't 
know but was presumably Frietag who called them names and that 
during the conversation the defendant Beau Heaps kept saying the 
guy--Frietag--was a psycho and a "tweeker"--a person on 
methamphetamine (Tr. 1475, 1503, 1514). They confirmed that 
defendant Bo Heaps led the procession to the vehicle to go to the 
Frietag residence to party and straighten matters out with Frietag 
and that the Defendant, Lavulavu was mad that Heaps had called him 
because he was afraid of Frietag. The defendants loaded the beer 
into coolers and into the Lavulavu vehicle because that was the 
only ride they had (Tr. 1440, 1475-76, 1485-86, 1503) . The only 
comment about Frietag was made by the defendant Beau Heaps who 
asked if anyone anted to go over and "kick his ass" (Tr. 1581) . No 
comments were made about shooting or hurting Mr. Frietag by any 
other defendants. In fact, the Defendant Lavulavu did not want to 
go. After arriving near the Frietag apartment, because they had 
missed the turn off, both confirmed that the defendants were 
talking loudly, not trying to conceal themselves and walking 
casually. He stated that the defendant Unga stopped by a tree, that 
he, David Niemeitolu and Tonga Mounga went to the side of the 
house, Tony Tai was located in front of the door, Heaps was behind 
a vehicle and the Defendant was standing beyond the step to the 
apartment. The Defendant Tai approached the door (Tr. 1444-5, 1453, 
1476, 1480, 1486, 1489-90, 1498, 1504, 1510, 1515, Ex. 5, 6, 9, 10, 
35) . 
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15. The defendants heard someone ask, if Susan was there and 
he, David Niemeitolu and Tonga Mounga joined the Defendant below 
the porch, approximately four to six feet from the door. At that 
time, the screen door was open and the main front door was also 
open (Tr. 1446-47, 1473, 1490, 1500, 1505, 1517 Ex. 6). They 
confirmed that as he was approaching the door that they saw a 
reflection of a gun in Frietag's hand and that Malupo told the 
other individuals twice. Mounga confirmed that he saw Frietag 
hiding something in his hand against the wall that appeared to be 
a gun (Tr. 1448-50, 1491, 1505, 1515 Exhibit 6). Malupo confirmed 
that the reflection could have been the crossbow. (Tr. 144 9-50, 
Exhibit 13) . Mounga and Malupo reacted to the observation by 
running away (Tr. 1450-52, 1492, Ex. 13) . As he was running, Malupo 
testified that he saw the Defendant Lavulavu's hand outstretched, 
pointed away from Frietag and the front door, but did not see a gun 
but then heard a shot (Tr. 1452-53, 1472-3, Ex. 6, 7 9, 43). Malupo 
did not know where the defendant Beau Heaps or other defendants 
were located at the time the shot was fired (Tr. 1452-53) . In a 
statement given to police after he was arrested Malupo stated that 
the Defendant had a gun at the scene and after returning to the car 
said that what happened was "just between us." The other defendants 
remember no conversation (Tr. 1458-65, 1508). On cross-examination, 
Malupo stated that he neither saw the Defendant with a gun on the 
night of the shooting nor heard any threats (Tr. 1472) . He only saw 
the gun in the trunk of the Defendants car when he opened the 
trunk of the vehicle earlier that night (Tr. 1472, Ex. 2) . The 
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defendant Niemeitolu testified that he saw the Defendant Lavulavu 
pull a gun from his right side and four seconds later, heard a shot 
(Tr. 1506-7). In a statement to police, Niemeitolu testified that 
the Defendant walked to the door, after hearing that Frietag had a 
gun and said "want me to shoot him" twice and then shot him 
(Tr. 1508-09, 1515). 
16. David Richard Allman and his wife Dixie Lee Allman 
testified that they resided at 395 East 400 North in Orem, Utah 
County, Utah and that during the early morning hours of August 25, 
1996, they saw a small white car pull up in front of his house and 
five or six individuals with dark hair and dark complexion exit the 
vehicle and head north on 400 East. The individuals were loud and 
not attempting to conceal their activities (Tr. 1094-95, 1098-99, 
1101, Ex. 4, 5). As the individuals passed, Allmans testified that 
they heard someone say, "That mother f--er doesn't know who he is 
dealing with" (Tr. 1095, 1099). Fearing that their might be a 
fight, Mr. Allman called 911. After approximately a fifteen-second 
conversation, Allman walked outside and shortly thereafter, heard 
a shot from the North. Allman then had his wife call 911 again and 
report the shot to police (Tr. 1095-96) . Allman reported that 
shortly thereafter, he saw the same individuals walk back to the 
car and head West along 400 North. Mrs. Allman testified she saw 
them head East after returning to the vehicle (Tr. 1096, 1100, 
Ex. 5). Mrs. Allman testified that she went to the Frietag 
residence with an officer and saw Mr. Frietag's body, with his feet 
outside of the entrance to the apartment (Tr. 1102) . 
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17. Rodney Allen Brerton testified that he lived in the 
adjoining duplex to Mr. Frietag and that at the time of the 
shooting, between 12:00 and 1:00, he was watching television with 
Nancy Bollschweiler (Tr. 1103-4, 1196). Mr. Brerton heard yelling 
and what seemed to be an altercation. Both he and Nancy testified 
that they could identify Tongans from the accent of the individuals 
(Tr. 1199). Mr. Brerton looked out his window and saw one standing 
behind Mr. Frietag's car crouched down with something in his hand. 
Brerton thought it was a beer can but could not be sure. He heard 
the gunshot and then saw a group of six individuals, nonwhites, 
standing at the end of Mr. Frietag's driveway and heard one of the 
individuals say, "He doesn't know who the fuck he's messing with." 
The argument continued both before and after the shooting (Tr. 
1104-6, 1110-12, 1115, 1119, Ex. 6-9). Brerton testified that when 
he went to investigate, the lower glass portion of the storm door 
to the Frietag residence was shattered and the main door closed. 
Brerton and Nancy then entered the residence through the garage 
after hearing Mr. Frietag call for help (Tr. 1106-8, 1203, Ex. 11-
14). Rodney and Nancy saw a crossbow with an arrow lying next to 
Mr. Frietag (Tr. 1007-8, 1114, 1209). 
18. The Huff mans testified that they were awakened at the 
time of the shooting by voices, what seemed like an interchange 
between two people and then they heard he shot (Tr. 1118, 1123) . 
19. Counsel for the Defendant proffered that witnesses would 
testify that Mr. Frietag had been off medication and was acting 
bizarrely. Specifically, that because of a chemical imbalance 
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caused by the medication and the use of marijuana and alcohol, he 
would dress up like a woman and that his abilities to control his 
emotions and aggressiveness were seriously influenced. Counsel for 
the Defendant proffered that the evidence demonstrated that at the 
time of death, Mr. Frietag's public hair had been dyed, that he had 
shaved his legs, that he was wearing women's bikini-thong underwear 
and women's jewelry indicating that Mr. Frietag was having mental 
difficulties (Tr.1126-28). Additionally, the defense proffered 
expert testimony, based upon the records of Mr. Frietag that he had 
engaged in a life of serious drug and alcohol abuse and that 
withdrawal from those drugs could cause depression, violence, 
paranoia and other mental problems (Tr. 1629-58). The trial court 
refused to allow the admission of the evidence (Tr. 1128, 1524-25, 
1578-80, 1657-58, Exhibit 47, 48). 
C. Investigation of the Shooting. 
20. Officer Gary Downing, a detective sergeant with the Orem 
Police Department was the lead investigator on the case against the 
Defendant (Tr. 1129). The officer recovered a cassette tape from 
the Frietag answering machine that recorded approximately fifteen 
minutes prior to the encounter, the events surrounding the shooting 
and, the aftermath. (Tr. 1129-30, Ex. 15, 17) . The officer 
testified that a thud was heard on the tape prior to the door bell 
ringing (which thud the officer attributes to Frietag firing his 
cross bow at the closet door) (Tr. 1130, 1133, 1135, Ex. 16). The 
officer testified that there were a number of holes in the door 
(some penetrating the entire door) that matched the circumference 
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of the dart from the cross bow, which the officer characterized as 
a deadly weapon (Tr. 1133-34, Ex. 17) . The officer acknowledged 
that the Frietag house was not completely searched and that it was 
left unattended overnight (Tr. 1134-36, 1137-38). The officer noted 
that there were .22 shells on the floor of the apartment where 
Mr. Frietag was located but no darts in the door when it was 
retrieved as evidence (Tr. 1127, 1135). 
21. Officer Downing testified that the tape demonstrated that 
before Mr. Frietag said that the "cops were on their way," there 
was no yelling or raised voices (Tr. 1136) . Thereafter the shot was 
heard and then the voice of the neighbor Nancy, as she attended to 
the victim (Tr. 1136) . 
22. Officer Harold Young testified that he was the first 
officer at the scene (Tr. 1138-9). The officer testified contrary 
to other witnesses that the front door, behind the broken screen 
door was open when he arrived (Tr. 114 0). The officer did observe 
the crossbow at Mr. Frietagfs feet, .22 bullets in his left hand 
and around his body and crossbow arrows (Tr. 114 0-42). Further, 
although a log was kept as to the persons at the scene, there were 
inaccuracies in the log (Tr. 1144-45) . Nancy Ann Bollschweiler 
testified that the crossbow had been moved from when she discovered 
it upon entering the apartment (Tr. 1247). 
23. Officer Jay Fletcher gathered evidence from the scene and 
took photographs (Tr. 1150-51) . The officer found no beer cans 
between the automobiles in the driveway (Tr. 1154) . The officer 
acknowledged that the holes in the door of the Frietag residence 
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matched the arrows from the crossbow fired by Frietag. Further, the 
condition of the crossbow was that of the weapon after it had been 
fired (Tr. 1156-59) . Although a firearm was not found, the officers 
did only a cursory search of the residence (Tr. 1158) . The officer 
did find prescription bottles in Mr. Frietag's name (Tr. 1158). 
Contrary to what Mr. Frietag had told neighbors, the officer 
testified that it would be unusual for the police to give a private 
citizen a bullet proof vest and ask someone to lure criminals to 
his house (Tr. 1160) . In fact, Mr. Frietag was not aligned with NET 
or other law enforcement agency prior to his death, although he 
told his neighbors and close friends that he was. Additionally, no 
letter threatening his stepdaughter was ever given to police 
(Tr. 1231-32, 1612-20) . 
24. Nancy Ann Bollschweiler testified that she had been a 
friend and neighbor of Mr. Frietag for over a year (Tr. 1188-89) . 
She testified that she knew that Mr. Frietag had purchased the 
crossbow six or seven months before the shooting and had practiced 
firing the same with his children into the door to the linen closet 
(Tr. 1189-90) . Nancy testified that Mr. Frietag was on prescription 
medication for a mental condition (Tr. 1223). She testified that 
Mr. Frietag suffered from anxiety attacks that could cause him to 
be afraid. In fact she actually observed him having an anxiety 
attach during 1996 (Tr. 1226-28). 
25. Edward Leis, from the Utah State Examiner's Office 
testified that he did an autopsy on Mr. Frietag and discovered a 
gunshot wound in the abdomen (Tr. 1259), needle marks in the flex 
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point of the right arm (Tr. 1260) , evidence of marijuana use in the 
urine (consistent with usage 24-48 hours prior to death) (Tr. 1260-
61, 1281), a blood-alcohol level of .09 taken from fluid in the eye 
and .06 in the blood (Tr. 1261, 1282). The doctor testified that 
the bullet had irregularities consistent both with being deflected 
prior to entry and not being deflected (Tr. 1272, 1292) . The doctor 
testified that the bullet perforated the stomach, struck the aorta 
and hit a portion of the backbone (Tr. 1272-75). The bullet bit the 
back two or three inches lower than the entrance wound (Tr. 1285) . 
The doctor could not calculate the height of the gun without 
knowing whether the victim was standing straight up or crouched at 
the time of penetration (Tr. 1293-1296). The doctor testified to 
the presence of earrings, paint on his hands and tattoos 
(Tr. 1298) . No gunshot residue test was done of the decedent 
(Tr. 1324-25). 
26. The testimony of Officer Barry Nielsen was proffered that 
he received a call to respond to a suspicious vehicle and while 
following one car traveling on 400 North, spotted another car 
coming toward him on 400 North that was white and followed it and 
eventually initiated a traffic stop (Tr. 1328-29). 
27. Officers Gordon Christensen and Eric Beveridge testified 
they got a call from dispatch of a suspicious vehicle in the area 
of 395 East 400 North in Orem, with numerous occupants getting out 
and walking away (Tr. 1331, 1373). They testified that subsequently 
dispatch told them that shots had been fired in the area where the 
occupants had exited the vehicle (Tr. 1332, 1373). At that time, 
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Barry Nielsen radioed that he was following a car that matched the 
description of being a white passenger car with four doors 
(Tr. 1335). Officer Christensen testified that he also heard that 
there were five dark-complexioned male occupants. (Tr. 1335-36). A 
subsequent review of the dispatch tape revealed that there was no 
mention of dark-skinned people in the vehicle (Tr. 1363-66) . 
28. The officers instructed the occupants to exit the vehicle 
and the Defendant, who was driving, exited the vehicle. The vehicle 
was registered to Mr. Lavulavu's family (Tr. 1339-41, 1375). The 
occupants were handcuffed as they exited (Tr. 1384) . The Defendant 
was completely cooperative with the officers (Tr. 1368) . The 
officers thereupon searched the car and found a steak knife, tire 
iron, a BB gun under the front seat and a wood handled .38 caliber 
gun, located halfway under the seat on the driver's side (Tr. 1348-
49, 1361, 1379-80) . The officer determined that the .38 caliber gun 
had one spent cartridge and two live cartridges (Tr. 1350-51, 1356, 
1380) . The co-defendant Beau Heaps was sitting in the back seat of. 
the vehicle (Tr. 1377). 
29. Robert W. Brinkman, a criminalist, testified that he 
found no gunshot residue from the samples taken from the Defendant 
after he was arrested and that the samples taken from the co-
defendant Beau Heaps were positive for two particles (Tr. 1531) . 
Brinkman than analyzed the four pockets of the pants worn by the 
Defendant and Heaps and found particles characteristic of gunshot 
residue in the left front and left rear pockets of the Defendant, 
Lavulavu and none from the pockets of Heaps (Tr. 1531-32) . No 
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residue was found on the exterior of the Defendant's shirt or pants 
(Tr. 1541) . The existence of residue means that the person fired a 
weapon or was near someone who had (Tr. 153 2) . Inasmuch as the 
residue was found inside the left pant pockets of the Defendant 
Lavulavu, where gunshot residue would be slow to dissipate, it is 
impossible to tell when the residue was deposited (Tr. 1542). 
30. Brinkman testified that the gun identified during the 
trial (Ex.2) is consistent with the gun that fired the bullet found 
in Mr. Frietag's body (Tr. 1533-34, 1542, Ex.30). Brinkman 
testified that the screen door to the Frietag apartment had been 
shattered by a medium velocity object, consistent with a handgun 
(Tr. 1535-36, Exhibit 11) . Additionally, he testified that the 
screen door was partially open when it was shattered (Tr., 1537, 
1543, Ex. 29, 34) . 
31. Terry Routt, an employee of the Wasatch Mental Health 
organization testified that he visited John Frietag three to four 
times from the fall of 1995 to the spring of 1996 and on each 
occasion, when Mr. Routt approached the residence, Mr. Frietag 
would look out the window and identify who was there before opening 
the door (Tr. 1563). 
32. Allen Sunday from Easy Pawn testified that he had a 
Winchester 9034, 30-30 rifle belonging to Mr. Frietag from August 
3, 1996 (Ex. 51, Tr. 1564-65). 
33. The trial court allowed the confession of the Defendant 
into evidence. In the statement, the Defendant stated that he did 
not really know Mr. Frietag, that Mr. Frietag had threatened him on 
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the telephone by telling him to watch his back. The Defendant 
stated that Beau Heaps was the individual that was the motivating 
force to go to the Frietag residence. The Defendant stated that 
Heaps asked for the gun when they arrived at the Frietag residence. 
The Defendant admitted shooting Mr. Frietag, after asking "should 
I shoot" twice. The Defendant testified that the co-defendants Beau 
Heaps, Bo Malupo and Tonga Mounga told him to shoot (Tr. 1522, 
Ex. 27). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
pQINT I, The trial court committed error in ruling that the 
Orem City Officers had an articulable reasonable suspicion to 
support the traffic stop of the vehicle the Defendant was driving 
during the morning hours after the shooting. 
POINT II. The ruling of the trial court in denying the 
Defendant's motion to suppress, that the officers were justified in 
searching the vehicle the Defendant was driving, after he had been 
apprehended and cuffed constituted error. 
POINT III, The trial court abused its discretion and committed 
error in admitting statements attributed to the co-defendant Beau 
Heaps during the trial of the Defendant. In admitting the 
statements, the trial court ignored the principles established in 
Bruton and the Utah Rules of Evidence relating to the admission of 
evidence that is clearly prejudicial. Additionally, the trial court 
abused its discretion with regard to evidence relating to the 
violent character of the victim. 
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POINT IV. The court committed error in holding that the 
Defendant had waived his Miranda rights and given a voluntary and 
knowing confession. Accordingly, the admission of the confession 
was the Defendant was error. 
POINT V, The evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's 
verdict in the matter and accordingly, the verdict and the judgment 
of the lower court should be set aside. 
ARgPMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FROM THE ILLEGAL 
STOP OF THE VEHICLE THE DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING. 
A. Summary of Facts. 
The trial court's Ruling denying the Defendant's motion to 
suppress is contained in the Addendum as Exhibit "B." The facts 
found by the trial court that relate to the motion to suppress 
comprise the first eight numbered paragraphs which are set out for 
convenience: 
1. On August 25, 1996 at approximately 1:06 a.m., Orem 
dispatch received a call from a citizen who reported five 
or six dark complected males had parked a white sedan in 
front of his house at 395 E. 400 North Orem, and were 
"bailing out." Based upon their manner and the 
conversation he overheard, the citizen was afraid there 
was going to be a fight. 
2. Approximately two minutes later, another call was 
received from the same residence indicating shots had 
been fired. While on the line with dispatch, the caller 
saw the males get back in the car and leave westbound on 
400 North. The caller reported that another person at the 
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house had heard the males say "That mother fucker doesn't 
know who he's dealing with" prior to getting back into 
the vehicle. 
3 . Officers were given a description of the vehicle and 
the passengers, a "white passenger car" carrying five or 
six "dark-skinned males." 
4. Officer Barry Nielsen was northbound on State 
Street, south of 400 North. He saw a car come from 400 
North and turn northbound on State Street. He could not 
identify if the vehicle matched the description given by 
dispatch, so he followed it on State Street. When he 
passed 400 North, he looked eastbound and saw only one 
pair of headlights traveling westbound on 400 North 
towards State Street. 
5. As Officer Nielsen approached the vehicle northbound 
on State Street, he observed that it was a dark colored 
passenger car. In his rearview mirror, he saw the other 
car westbound on 400 North turn south on State Street and 
observed that it was a white passenger car. He turned his 
vehicle around and followed the car now southbound on 
State Street. 
6. Officer Nielsen continued to follow the white car as 
it turned westbound on Center Street. Prior to reaching 
4 00 West, he was able to determine that there were 
several male occupants in the vehicle. He and other 
officers initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle at the 
intersection of Center Street and 400 West. 
7. The officers removed the occupants of the vehicle 
and placed them in handcuffs. The occupants were informed 
that an individual had been shot in the area they had 
just left and a car matching the description of their car 
was scene [sic] driving away. 
8. Officers Gordon Christensen and Eric Beveridge 
searched the vehicle and located a .38 caliber revolver 
from under the drivers' seat, which was where the 
Defendant was sitting when the vehicle was stopped. The 
officers also located a steak knife, tire iron, and a BB 
gun in the vehicle. 
The trial court held that under the totality of circumstances 
test, a reasonable articulable suspicion existed that the Defendant 
had committed a crime, thus justifying the traffic stop (R. 262-
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63) . The trial court based its ruling on the following facts. 
First, the call to dispatch from a citizen that five or six dark 
complected had exited a car near their residence, together with the 
consideration of the time of occurrence and the statement allegedly 
made by the individuals. Second, the follow-up call to dispatch 
indicating that a shot was heard, the five or six individuals 
returning to the car and the statement allegedly made at that time. 
Third, the officers observing a vehicle with occupants that matched 
the description and the lack of other traffic exiting the area 
where the shot was fired (R. 262-63) 
B. Law As Applied to the Pacts. 
I. The Stop of the Defendant's Vehicle 
Constituted a Seizure Under the Utah and 
United States Constitutions. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and 
seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. A similar right is contained in 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. It follows that 
"people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they 
step from their homes onto the public sidewalk." Delaware v. 
Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1970) (citing Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 
(1968)). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that "whenever a police 
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk 
away, he has 'seized' that person." Terry, supra at 16. A person is 
deemed seized "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and 
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the resulting detention quite brief.11 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648 (1979). 
{S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants 
constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of [the Fourth and 
Fourteenth] Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the resulting detention quite brief." State v. Case. 
884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Delaware v. 
Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). 
There is no question that the officers' command to the 
Defendant, the driver of the vehicle in this case constituted a 
seizure under both the Utah and United States Constitution. 
II. The Requirements of a Constitutional Seizure. 
The United States Constitution and the Constitution of Utah 
prohibit unreasonable seizures. A limited crime investigation stop, 
as defined by Terry v. Ohio, and its progeny may be determined to 
be constitutionally reasonable only after a court makes a dual 
inquiry. First the police officer's action must be "justified at 
its inception." Second, the resulting detention must be "reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that justify the interference 
in the first place" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968) . 
There is no question that if an officer reasonably suspects a 
person of violating an applicable traffic regulation or other 
crime, the police officer may legally stop that person. State v. 
Fiaueroa-Solorio. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Marshall/ 791 P.2d 880, 883 n. 3 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Talbot. 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 
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App. 1990) . There is no question that the Defendant did not violate 
any traffic laws. 
Absent a violation of the traffic code, the only basis to 
initiate a stop is based upon Utah Code Annotated 77-7-15 (1982 as 
Amended), which provides: 
A police officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
Id. £££ al&£ State v. Menke. 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). £££, Stat'g v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994). 
Numerous Utah cases have dealt with the question of what 
constitutes a reasonable suspicion, gee State v. Mendoza. 748 P. 2d 
181 (Utah 1987); State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam); State v. Menke. .supra; State v. Sierra. 774 P.2d 972 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); gfrate v» Truiillo. 739 P.2d 785 (Utah App. 1987). 
In defining reasonable suspicion, the Courts have noted that: 
While the required level of suspicion is lower than the 
standard required for probable cause to arrest, the same 
totality of facts and circumstances approach is used to 
determine if there are sufficient "specific and 
articulable facts' to support reasonable suspicion. Id.t 
Terry v. Ohio, SUPra at 19-20. 
The facts supporting reasonable suspicion may come from the 
officer's own observations as well as "information, bulletins, or 
flyers received from other lav* enforcement sources. State v. Case. 
251 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . The cases have required 
that any suspicion be based upon ob-iective facta which indicate the 
existence of criminal activity. State v. Talbot. 134 Utah Adv. Rep. 
29 
15, 17 (Utah App. 1990) . Second, "the officer must be able to 
articulate what it is about those facts which leads to inference of 
criminal activity." State v. Menke. supra at 541. If the officer is 
unable to articulate what facts and inferences led to his 
suspicion, the suspicion is classified as a mere hunch and will not 
justify the subsequent stop. Id. See also. State v. Talbot. 
Finally, 
The facts [must] be judged against an objective standard: 
Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of 
the seizure or the search "warrant a [person] of 
reasonable .caution in the belief" that the action taken 
was appropriate? Anything less would invite intrusions 
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing 
more substantial than inarticulate hunches. 
Trujiiio. supra at 88/ state v, Talbot/ supra; Terry vt QhiQ/ 
supra. 
The appellate courts have indicated that under certain 
circumstances, police officers can rely on a dispatched report in 
making a stop. A Terry stop made in objective reliance upon a flyer 
or bulletin is proper "if the police who issued the flyer or 
bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion .justifying a stop." 
United States v. Hensely, 469 U.S. 221,223 (1985). As stated in 
Case. "the legality of a stop based on information imparted by 
another will depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts 
known to the [officer] originating the information or bulletin 
subsequently received and acted upon by the investigating officer." 
Id. at 1277. However, the investigating officer need not be 
actually informed of all the underlying facts known to the 
30 
originating officer that establish reasonable suspicion XsL. at 1277 
n.5. State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646, 649-51 (Utah 1989). 
A review of the type of conduct that the Court has held 
generally to constitute a reasonable suspicion is helpful. In State 
v. Munsen, 173 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah App. 1991), the Court held 
that the failure of the defendant and her companion to explain the 
ownership of a vehicle which was parked in a parking lot did not 
rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. 
Numerous cases have held that the mere fact that a person was 
in the company of others with bad reputations does not necessarily 
conjoin that persons' actions with the person of bad reputation. A 
"person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of 
criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable 
cause to search that person." Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85, 91 
(1979). The Supreme Court held in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-
52 (1979), that mere presence in a neighborhood frequented by drug 
users does not give rise to reasonable suspicion. In fact the 
Supreme Court has noted that presumptions of guilt are not to be 
made by mere meetings. United States v. Pi Re. 332 U.S. 581 (1948) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that no reasonable suspicion could 
even be assumed where a man walking near the defendant had run 
away. State v. Ramirez. 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 14 (Utah 1991) . The 
Court held that traveling at what may seem a suspicious time in a 
suspicious location alone is insufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion. State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicium of criminal 
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activity was truck driving on a public road late at night) . In 
State v. Truiillo. 739 P. 2d 85, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the Court 
held that three individuals, who were walking along slowly, looking 
into store windows, in a high-crime neighborhood, and who then 
acted nervous at their initial encounter with officers did not 
present sufficient facts to justify the formation of a reasonable 
suspicion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that circumstances such as a 
car stopped during early morning hours on a highway was of "little 
relevance." State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 183-84 (Utah 1987). In 
State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986), the Court held 
that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle without-
out-of-state plates moving slowly through a frequently burglarized 
neighborhood at 3:00 a.m. In State v. Struber 319 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1997), the Court held that there were not sufficient 
facts upon which the officer could form a reasonable suspicion when 
the defendant backed up towards a construction area and signs that 
read "road closed." The Defendant then parked his vehicle and 
turned off his lights. The Court held that there were any number of 
possible innocent explanations for the behavior and that the stop 
was illegal. Id. at 39. 
The Utah Appellate Courts have held that an officer may base 
a finding of reasonable suspicion upon information from third 
parties only if the information was issued on the basis of 
articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted 
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person has committed an offense. State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650 
(Utah 1989) . 
The Court thoroughly analyzed the issue in State v. Case. 251 
Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . In that case an officer 
received a dispatch call directing him to a specific area to 
investigate a possible car prowl or car burglary. The dispatcher 
described the suspect as male with a chunky build, possibly 
Hispanic, wearing a white tee shirt. Subsequently, the officer 
noticed a passenger in a vehicle which matched the description. The 
officer stopped the vehicle for questioning. During the course of 
the officers investigation, he detected the odor of alcohol and 
arrested the defendant for driving under the influence. 
The Utah Court of Appeals adopted the test set out by the 
United States Supreme Court in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 
(1971). The Court held, 
. . . that an officer can make a valid arrest based on 
such broadcast information only if the department issuing 
the information had sufficient probable cause to support 
the arrest warrant. 
Id. at 568. 
The Court in Case then concluded: 
Consequently, if the investigating officer cannot provide 
independent or corroborating information through his or 
her own observations, the legality of a stop based on 
information imparted by another will depend on the 
sufficiency Q£ fckg articulable facts known to the 
individual originating fcllS information or bulletin 




Id. at 27. £££ alSQi State v. Steel. 827 P.2d 954, 960 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
The Court found that the information transmitted to the 
officer in Case was legally insufficient. The Court found that 
simply reporting a car prowl, the location of the car prowl, and 
information regarding the suspect was insufficient. Id. at 28. The 
Court cont inued: 
Merely providing descriptive information to an officer 
about whom to stop, by itself, is not enough to justify 
the stop if there are no articulable facts pointed to 
which establish why a stop was to be made. 
Id. at 28. 
The Utah Court of Appeals re-examined the issue in Kaysville 
City v. Mulcahy. 321 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In 
that case the informant called police and reported that a "drunk 
individual" had been at his front door and had driven away in a 
white car, a Toyota Celica and had driven out of his subdivision 
going East towards the mountains. The officer had a traffic stop 
based upon the information provided. The Court held to the test in 
Case and held that an officer can rely on a dispatched report if 
there was adequate articulable suspicion that spurred the dispatch. 
Id. at 18. 
The Court held that to undertake the task, the court had an 
obligation of probing the reliability of the informant's tip. The 
first factor is the type of tip or informant involved. The Court 
noted that anonymous tips are at the "low-end of the reliability 
scale." State v. Roth. 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The 
Court held that citizen informants rank high on the reliability 
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scale because such people ordinarily volunteer information based 
upon concern for the community and can be held accountable civilly 
or criminally, if the report is false. Id., at 20, State V. Brown, 
798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
The second factor to be examined is whether the "informant 
gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support 
a stop." Id. . at 20, State v. Roth. 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) . The Court noted: 
A tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the 
informant observed the details personally, instead of 
simply relaying information from a third party. 
Id. . at 20. The Court noted that there must be no hint of 
fabrication. Id. 
The third factor identified by the Court is whether the police 
officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's report of 
the informant's tip. Id. The Court held that if the facts relating 
to the identity of the vehicle, the direction of travel and other 
details are confirmed, it is not necessary that the officer 
corroborate the intoxication. However, the Court noted that such a 
test applies in circumstances where the alleged intoxicated driver 
is on the roads, potentially subjecting the public to harm. The 
Court noted, 
We therefore must consider the ever-changing equation 
used to balance the rights of an individual to be free 
from unwarranted intrusions of his or her freedom of 
movement and the right to privacy with the right of the 
public to be protected from unreasonable danger. This 
equation and the balance change with the facts presented. 
Id,, at 20. 
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The Court last reviewed the matter in City of St. George v. 
Carter, 325 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In that case, 
the Court held that the report of an Arby's employee that a drive-
up customer had an open container of alcohol which included a 
definitive description of the vehicle with license plate 
information and location was sufficient to constitute a reasonable 
suspicion to make the traffic stop. Id. at 17. Applying the facts 
of the case to the law, the Court found that there was a sufficient 
basis for the stop. 
III. The Facts of This Case Demonstrate the Seizure 
was Illegal. 
It is submitted that the facts of this case clearly indicate 
that the officers did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion 
based upon the information that they received from dispatch. 
First, the Appellant does not question the right of the 
officer to rely on the citizen phoning the information to dispatch 
in that their identity was disclosed as required by the Court in 
its previous decisions. 
However, as to the second test, the officers clearly did not 
have a right to effectuate a stop. There is no question that the 
information disclosed to the officer must establish the existence 
of criminal activity. The first phone call revealed that five or 
six individuals exited a car from a public street and started 
walking down a public sidewalk. The case law is clear that the 
presence of a car or individuals in any area during the late 
evening hours does not constitute reasonable suspicion. The 
36 
individuals, as detailed in the Statement of Facts, were not trying 
to conceal their presence. The individuals parked their vehicle in 
a proper and conspicuous place, walked on the sidewalk at a normal 
pace, and engaged in conversation at a normal voice level. No one 
was dodging in and out of dark areas, whispering or parking cars in 
a dark or isolated area. 
The Court seemed to place emphasis on the fact that someone in 
the group said, "that m f doesn't know who is he dealing 
with11 and the citizen's conclusion that a fight might take place. 
The case law is clear that activity that is equally consistent with 
legal activity or not peculiar to criminal activity cannot be the 
basis of reasonable suspicion. State v. Humphrey. 314 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 48 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). There is absolutely no reason to 
believe that the statement was addressed to their present activity. 
It could have been made about an incident a year ago, last month, 
or weeks ago. The citizen heard no response by any of the other 
five or six individuals indicating some group rage. There was no 
identity of the individual referred to in the statement. The 
citizen saw no weapons. Simply, there was no basis or detail that 
would support the conclusion that there was going to be a fight. 
There is no law against parking where the Defendant parked or 
against walking on the sidewalk or making the statement alleged to 
have been made. Even if the individuals were going to confront 
someone, there is absolutely no basis to conclude that there was 
going to be any physical confrontation as opposed to a discussion 
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or even quarrel. The facts to that point simply do not evidence any 
criminal activity. 
In the second phone call, the citizen reports a shot fired 
which the police wrongfully interpret as "shots." The individuals 
are reported as walking back to the vehicle, not running. The car 
leaves at a normal pace and no activity is taken again to elude 
observation. In fact, the same statement is heard by the citizens 
upon return to the car. Most important, the citizen never claims to 
have observed a gun or an actual shot fired. There are innumerable 
events that may sound like a shot; to wit, backfire of an 
automobile, striking of certain objects, household explosions of 
materials, doors slamming and the like. The citizen hears no 
yelling, shouting or other signs of a confrontation. The only 
significant event from the second call is the unabashed conclusion 
of the citizen that he heard a shot. Under the test set out above, 
there was simply insufficient detail in the report to support the 
conclusion of a shot as opposed to a sound from other sources or 
that the Defendant was somehow related to the noise. The citizen 
only knew that the sound came from the large area, out of their 
view, where the Defendant was walking. 
The two conversations, taken together, simply do not establish 
a reasonable suspicion that there was criminal activity afoot and 
that the Defendant and his companions were associated with it. It 
is imperative that the Court separate the factual observations of 
the citizen from the unjustified conclusions relied upon by the 
officer and the trial court. The facts are that five or six 
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individuals exited a properly parked car and traveled on a public 
sidewalk at a normal pace, not trying to conceal their presence, 
without any observable weapons. One of the individuals makes a 
derogatory statement about an undescribed individual or event that 
could have happened years ago. A sound is heard that may have come 
from a gun or a myriad of other sources. No argument is heard and 
there are no sounds consistent with a fight. The individuals walk 
normally back to their car again, without attempting to conceal 
themselves and leave in a normal manner without undue acceleration. 
The facts, without unsubstantiated conclusions, simply fail to 
describe a crime and therefore to provide a basis for a reasonable 
suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle. 
The evil noted above was specifically identified in the Utah 
Court of Appeals analysis of the facts in Case: 
If such a factual foundation were not required, it would 
be possible to validate bogyig information or secure 
action based only on police hunches simply by sending 
information through police channels. Such information-
laundering legerdemain is simply not countenanced under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Id- at 29 n. 7. 
The logic of the Court of Appeals is clear. An officer upon 
seeing an individual cannot stop that individual on the mere hunch 
that the person may have violated the law. The officer must 
actually be in a position to conclude reasonably that a public 
offense was committed. To do so, the officer must be aware, through 
his senses, of facts supporting the conclusion. 
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If an officer could stop an individual based only on legal 
conclusions of a citizen, without the need of specific need of 
factual detail supporting legal conclusion, a large gap would be 
created in the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment. In 
reality, officers would phone in their on nonspecific information, 
to justify stops. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FROM THE ILLEGAL 
SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE THE DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING. 
A. Summary of the Facts, 
The facts reflect that the officers, up to the time that the 
vehicle was searched, knew of no other material facts than stated 
in the preceding point. 
B. Law as Applied to the Facts of the Case. 
If the facts are insufficient to establish a reasonable 
suspicion for the initial stop as argued above, there clearly is no 
probable cause for the search of the vehicle. As noted in State v. 
Patefield. 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), "probable 
cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the 
[officers1] knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy 
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of 
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is 
being committed." (quoting State v. Dor;gey, 731 P. 2d 1085, 1088 
(Utah 1986)/ Brineaar v. United States. 338 U.S. 160, 175-76. Again 
probable cause is an objective standard based upon a reasonable 
review of the totality of circumstances State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 
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220, 226-7(Utah App. 1995). It is submitted that no probable cause 
can be established based upon the information in the possession of 
the officers at the time of the stop and search. 
Utah law is clear that "warrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement." State v. Brown. 853 P. 2d 851, 855 
(Utah 1992) . The State must demonstrate "that the circumstances of 
the seizure constitute an exception to the warrant requirement." 
State v. Stricklina. 844 P.2d 979, 985 (Utah App. 1992); State v, 
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah 1984). 
There is no question that the vehicle was not searched 
incident to an arrest. If a search is conducted incident to an 
arrest, an officer may search the area within the arrestee's 
"immediate control" to prevent the arrestee from obtaining weapons 
or destroying evidence. Chimel vT California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 
766 (1969); State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769. 784 (Utah App.) cert. 
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). The cases clearly establish that 
a search incident to arrest is proper only if (1) the arrest is 
lawful (New York V. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981); State v. 
Giron. 320 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); (2) the search 
is of the area within the arrestee's immediate control (Chimel v. 
California. supra at 763; and, (3) the search is conducted 
contemporaneously to the arrest. Id. 
Officer Gordon Christensen clearly and unequivocally testified 
that the Defendant and his companions were stopped, ordered from 
the vehicle, handcuffed, put in four separate patrol cars and then 
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the vehicle was searched. When the officers discovered the .38 
revolver, the Defendant and his companions were apparently 
Mirandized and transported to the Orem Police station, without 
being arrested (Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 270-86). There 
can be no factual dispute that no arrest was made that was 
contemporaneous in time and place with the search of the vehicle. 
The search cannot be justified based upon the inventory search 
exception. For an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle 
to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the officer conducting 
the search must follow standardized procedures. Colorado v. 
Bertine. 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987); State v. Giron. 320 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 31, 33 (Utah 1997). The officer's search must be in accordance 
with a standardized practice of inventory rather the suspicion of 
criminal activity. South Dakota v. Opperman. 479 U.S. 367.375 
(1987) . Here, the evidence is uncontroverted that the officers were 
not conducting an inventory, with an inventory sheet and a 
standardized practice, but instead, were pursuing the investigation 
of criminal activity (Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 270-86) . 
The State has the burden of introducing evidence that such a 
standardized reasonable procedure exists "and that the challenged 
police activity was essential in conformance with the procedure." 
State v. Strickling. 844 P. 2d 979, 987-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
State v. Giron, supra. 
The only other applicable exception is that based upon exigent 
circumstances. Exigent circumstances exist "only when the 
inevitable delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give way to 
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an urgent need for immediate action." United States v. Satterfield, 
743 F.2d 827, 844 (11th Cir. 1984). Utah courts have identified 
several exigent circumstances that may justify a warrantless 
search, including the immediate need to prevent harm to the 
officers, destruction of evidence, or escape of the suspect. State 
v. Ash. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); City of Orem v. Henrie. 
868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Belaard. 840 P.2d 
816, 823 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Palmer. 803 P.2d 1249, 1252 
(Utah App. 1990). 
In State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993), the Court 
concluded that the mere possibility that a suspect may have a 
weapon, or that evidence might be destroyed, is insufficient. Id. 
As noted in State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985), "once the 
threat the suspect will injure the officers with concealed weapons 
or will destroy evidence is gone, there is no persuasive reason why 
the officers cannot take the time to secure a warrant." The Court 
specifically noted that under Utah's telephonic warrant statute, no 
real impediment would be created for police investigations. Id. 
In this case, the Defendant and his companions all exited the 
vehicle without confrontation. The Defendant was cooperative and 
obeyed the officers. The Defendant and the persons with him were 
all handcuffed and placed in police vehicles before the search was 
conducted. There was absolutely no reason that the officers could 
not apply for a warrant. The facts of this case establish that the 
officers transported the Defendant and his companions to the police 
station and therefore there was no need to search the vehicle 
43 
before a warrant was obtained. Once the individuals were 
handcuffed, there was no fear of weapons or the destruction of 
evidence and thus, no exigent circumstances to justify the search. 
Accordingly, there was not a legal basis to justify the search and 
the evidence obtained therefrom must be suppressed. 
POINT III: THE ADMISSION OF STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO BEAU 
HEAPS WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED AND EVIDENCE RELATED TO THE 
VIOLENT CHARACTER OF THE VICTIM WAS IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED. 
A. Summary of Facts. 
Throughout the trial, the prosecution was allowed to introduce 
every aspect of the relationship between the victim John Frietag 
and the co-defendant, Beau Heaps, whose trial had been separated 
from that of the Defendant. Witnesses were allowed to testify 
regarding Heaps1 relationship for years with the victim. The 
evidence of that relationship, through the incident in July of 
1996, did not involve, in any way, the Defendant. The tape 
recording of the threats made by Heaps to Frietag on the answering 
machine was a clearly powerful exhibit. However, there was no 
evidence that the Defendant had any relationship with the victim 
and certainly no evidence that he was a party or even present when 
the voice message was made. All of the evidence relating to the 
statements that Heaps had made regarding Frietag simply had no 
connection with the Defendant. Only one witness testified to any 
conversation between Frietag and the Defendant and that was Tiana 
Heard who admitted that she did not hear the conversation and that 
the Defendant did not talk to her about any such conversation. 
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Counsel for the Defendant proffered evidence from two 
witnesses that the victim experienced violent outrages and periods 
on paranoia when he was off medication and was using drugs and 
alcohol. The witnesses also were prepared to testify that during 
such periods the victim acted bizarrely. The Defendant was 
precluded from using the fact that the victim was found in women1s 
underwear, with shaved legs, dyed pubic hair and jewelry to 
evidence the fact that he was going through a violent period and 
was experiencing paranoia. Additionally, the Defendant was barred 
from using the testimony of Dr. Wooten who was extensively 
proffered to the court. 
B. The Law Applied to the Facts of the Case. 
I. Admission of Statements Attributed to Heaps 
In Bruton v. The United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the trial 
court admitted at a joint trial the non-testifying co-defendant's 
confession, which also incriminated the defendant Bruton. The 
United State Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had 
thereby violated Bruton's constitutional right of confrontation, 
even though the jury was instructed to disregard the co-defendant's 
confession in determining Bruton's guilt or innocence. Id- at 127-
28. Specifically the United States Supreme Court held that where 
there is a substantial risk that the jury in a joint trial will use 
extrajudicial statements made by a non-testifying co-defendant to 
determine another co-defendant's guilt, the admission of the 
former's confession violates the latter's Sixth Amendment Right to 
confrontation. Id. 
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To invoke the Bruton doctrine, a statement must be powerfully 
and facially incriminating with respect to the other defendant and 
must directly, rather than indirectly, implicate the complaining 
defendant in the commission of the crime. Richardson v. Marsh, 107 
S. Ct. 1702, 1707 (1987); United States v. Jonas, 786 F.2d 1019, 
1022 (11th Cir. 1986). 
There is no question that the statements received in the 
present case that were allegedly made by Beau Heaps were in fact 
"powerfully and facially incriminating11 of the Defendant. 
Throughout the trial the State attempted to link the animosity 
between Frietag and Heaps to the Defendant. Accordingly, the Court 
was compelled to exclude the testimony. 
In addition to the mandate in Bruton, Rule 4 03 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
It is submitted that the statements were not relevant to state 
of mind, motive or other relevant issue in the case under Rule 4 01 
URE. However, even if relevant, the evidence should have been 
excluded under Rule 403. 
As noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 
P.2d 489, 493 (Utah 1985), "precedent . . . is of little value" in 
reviewing whether a trial court has correctly made the balancing 
test required by Rule 403. As mandated by Rule 403 URE, a trial 
court must exclude evidence when the potential for unfair prejudice 
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of a particular bit of evidence outweighs its probative value. 
State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1985). "Unfair 
prejudice" has been interpreted by the Utah Appellate Courts as 
meaning an "undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper 
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." State 
v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah App. 1991). 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The Advisory Committee's 
note reads: 
. That certain circumstances call for the 
exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned relevance. 
These circumstances entail risks which range all the way 
from inducing decision on a purely emotional basis, at 
one extreme, to nothing more harmful than merely wasting 
time, at the other extreme. 
Fed.R.Evid. 403 advisory committee's note, quoted in M. Graham, 
Handbook of Federal Evidence, Sec. 403.1, at 178 (2d ed. 1986). 
"Unfair prejudice" within the context of Rule 403 means an undue 
tendency to suggest a decision on any improper basis. Id. Graham, 
explains: 
Since all effective evidence is prejudicial in the 
sense of being damaging to the party against whom it is 
offered, prejudice which calls for exclusion is given a 
more specialized meaning: an undue tendency to suggest 
decision on an improper basis, commonly but not 
necessarily an emotional one, such as bias, sympathy, 
hatred, contempt, retribution or horror. Where a danger 
of unfair prejudice is perceived, the degree of likely 
prejudice must also be considered. The mere fact that 
evidence possesses a tendency to suggest a decision upon 
an improper basis does not require exclusion; evidence 
may be excluded only if the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the probative value of the 
proffered evidence. 
Id. at 182-83. 
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Another commentator noted that Rule 403 is particularly 
relevant when the disputed evidence applies primarily to less than 
all of the parties against whom the action involves. Id. at 180. In 
summary, courts must be sensitive to any "unfair advantage that 
results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by 
illegitimate means." 22 C.Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and 
Procedure. Section 5215 at 275 (1978); Carter vf Hewitt, 617 F.2d 
961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980); 1 J. Weinstein & M. Burger, Weinstein' s 
Evidence. Section 403 [03] at 403-15 to 403-17 (1978). 
The courts have found that evidence admitted for the purpose 
of evaluating credibility may be intact under Rule 403. United 
States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 797 (8th Cir. 1980); United States 
v. Domingez. 604 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1984). 
The following expressions in federal cases illustrate the 
interpretation given in Rule 403 by a number of federal courts: 
United States v. Dailleaux. 685 F.2d 1105, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(unfair prejudice results from . . . that aspect of the evidence 
which makes conviction more likely because it provokes an emotional 
response in the jury or otherwise intends to affect adversely the 
jury's attitude toward the defendant wholly a part from its 
judgment as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.); 
Carter v. Hewitt. 617 F.2d 961 972-73 (3d Cir. 1980) ("it is 
unfairly prejudicial if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, 
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or 
otherwise may cause a jury to base its decision on something other 
than the established propositions in the case."); United States v. 
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McCray. 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979) (the major function of 
Rule 403 "is limited to excluding matters of scant or cumulative 
probative force, dragged in by the heals for the sake of its 
prejudicial effect . . . to permit the trial judge to preserve the 
fairness of the proceeding by exclusion despite its relevance."). 
An example of the application of Rule 4 03 that is relevant to 
these proceedings is found in United States v. Barletta, 652 F.2d 
218 (1st Cir. 1981). The government in that case sought to admit 
into evidence a tape recording of a conversation between the 
defendant and a governmental informant. The apparent purpose of the 
informer's telephone call was to obtain an admission from the 
defendant that he had participated in criminal conduct several 
months before. Although relevant, the court explained why the tapes 
potential for prejudice substantially outweighed any probative 
value: 
[T]he overall context of the tape could legitimately 
be found prejudicial by virtue of its tendency to suggest 
a kind of "guilt by association." The court might 
reasonablely have concluded that a jury would ascribe 
undue influence to the mere fact that a defendant had a 
casual conversation with an admitted criminal, leading to 
a conviction based on a generalized assessment of 
character. This possibility might be thought particularly 
acute where . as herer Lhs conversation includes 
obscenities, ethnic slurs, and otherwise coarse language 
warped and suffused with an aura of nonspecific 
criminality because of the very medium of a 
governmentally planned clandestine overhearing. (Emphasis 
added). 
Id. at 220. 
Another helpful case is State v. Barlor. 498 P.2d 1276 (Id. 
1972). In that case the defendant was charged with assault with a 
deadly weapon, growing out of an altercation he had with the victim 
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when he observed him sitting with the defendant's wife in her car. 
At trial, the victim was permitted to testify that after the 
incident but prior to the trial, the defendant telephoned the 
victim and threatened him by saying, "I'll put you in the morgue." 
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the conviction because of the 
erroneous admission of the telephone call. The Court held that the 
statement regarding the morgue did not in itself tend to establish 
an intent or state of mind at the time of the commission of the 
criminal offense. Id. at 1283. The Court further held that even if 
it could gleam some probative value from the telephone 
conversation, it would be so slight that its admittance into 
evidence would not be justified in light of the possible prejudice 
to the defendant. See. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 
1983); State v, Troyer, 9io P.2d ii82 (Utah 1995); state v, Albue, 
754 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988); State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 
1989); State v. Menzies 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). 
The Defendant respectfully submits that the statements 
allegedly made by Beau Heaps should have been excluded under Rule 
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
50 
II. Admission of Evidence Relevant to the Violent 
Propensities Of the Victim. 
Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as 
follows: 
(A) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's 
character or trait of character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent 
trait of character offered by an accused, or by the 
prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent 
trait of character of the victim of the crime 
offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same; or evidence of a character trait of 
peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence 
that the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character 
as a witness, as provided by the Rules 607, 608 and 
609. 
In interpreting Rule 4 04 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
Utah Supreme Court's prior decisions are instructive. In State v. 
Gotschgol, 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), the trial court admitted 
statements made by the defendant on the day of the murder referring 
to a baseball bat as his "attitude adjustor." The Utah Supreme 
Court held that the evidence was relevant to show the defendant's 
state of mind at the time of the crime, an issue that was relevant 
to the defendant's claim of self defense. Xd. at 463. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that the evidence, if admissible under Rule 404, 
must pass scrutiny under Rule 403 URE. Only when the proposed 
evidence is found to be admissible under Rules 403 and 404, is the 
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evidence properly admitted. £££. State v. Gotschell. supra at 462; 
State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Utah 1989); State V. 
McCardel, 762 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah 1982). 
In fit-.at-.ft v. Albue, 754 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme 
Court specifically outlined the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements made by a homicide victim: 
In State v. Wauneka. 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977), following 
the reasoning of United States v. Brown. 490 F.2d 758 
(D.C. Cir. 1973), we enunciated general rules on the 
admissibility of evidence of out-of-court statements made 
by a homicide victim who reports threats of death or 
serious bodily injury made by the defendant. Wauneka held 
that such hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible, but 
may be admitted under the state-of-mind exception to the 
hearsay rule if it is not used to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted and if certain other criteria are met, 
specifically: (I) the evidence is probative of the 
decedent's state of mind at the time of the killing, and 
(ii) the decedent's state of mind has already been placed 
in issue by defense evidence or argument that the killing 
was (a) a suicide, (b) in self-defense, or ( c ) an 
accident to which the decedent contributed by acting as 
an aggressor. Wauneka also suggested that the evidence 
might be admissible if the identity of the killer is at 
issue. Id. 
Id. at 937. 
The Court in State v. Albue. supra held that Rule 803(3) URE 
embodies the holding in Wauneka. Rule 803(3) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, provides as follows: 
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of 
mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as 
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and 
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless 
it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, 
or terms of declarant's will. 
There is no question that evidence relating to a propensity 
for violence of the victim is admissible under Rule 404(a)(2). The 
52 
Defendant properly raised self defense in the case and the issue of 
how the confrontation between the parties developed was central to 
the resolution of that issue. 
The Defendant proffered that witnesses were prepared to 
testify that Mr. Frietag had been off medication and was acting 
bizarrely. Specifically, that because of a chemical imbalance 
caused by the medication and the use of marijuana and alcohol, he 
would dress up like a woman and that his ability to control his 
emotions and aggressiveness were seriously influenced. The 
Defendant was refused the right to point out to the jury that at 
the time of death, Mr. Frietagfs public hair had been dyed, he had 
shaved his legs, was wearing women's bikini-thong underwear and 
women's jewelry indicating that Mr. Frietag was having mental 
difficulties (Tr.1126-28) . 
The defense also proffered expert testimony, based upon the 
medical and psychological records of Mr. Frietag that he had 
engaged in a life of serious drug and alcohol abuse and that 
withdrawal from those drugs could cause depression, violence, 
paranoia and other mental problems (Tr. 1629-58). The trial court's 
refusal to admit the evidence was an abuse of discretion (Tr. 1128, 
1524-25, 1578-80, 1657-58, Exhibit 47, 48) . There is no question 
that the victim had been drinking at the time of the shooting and 
had significant prescription and other drugs in his possession. 
Evidence relating to the effect of withdrawal from those drugs and 
the use of alcohol offered by the Defendant was clearly relevant to 
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the violent propensity of the victim under those circumstances and 
should have been admitted. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN HOLDING 
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD KNOWINGLY WAIVED HIS 
MIRANDA RIGHTS AND IN ADMITTING THE DEFENDANT'S 
CONFESSIONt 
A, Summary of Facts. 
The trial court found that officer Downey testified at the 
suppression hearing that he read the Defendant his Miranda rights 
and pausing, after each right, received an acknowledgment from the 
Defendant, Officer Downey testified that the Defendant waived his 
Miranda rights and would make a statement in the absence of an 
attorney. The Defendant was presented with a form outlining each 
right and voluntarily signed the form indicating that he understood 
his rights and voluntarily waving the same. At no time did the 
Defendant, during the statement indicate that he did not understand 
English or wished to discontinue the statement (R. 258-65). 
Lois Dettenmaier, who holds a Ph.D in psychology testified for 
purposes of the suppression hearing that she specialized in 
learning disabilities (Tr. 1017). In that regard, she testified 
that she was trained to assess a person's psychological, academic 
and intellectual level of function (Tr. 1020-21). Dr. Dettenmaier 
testified that she undertook to investigate the Defendant's ability 
to understand the Miranda rights admonition form printed in English 
(Tr. 1020). The witness reviewed the tape of the confession, the 
"admonition of rights" form signed by the Defendant and a 
transcript of the statement (Tr. 1020). The doctor administers the 
54 
Wechsler Adult intelligence Scale which indicated the Defendant's 
I.Q. to be below average, 86 (Tr. 1021) . The Defendant scored an 87 
on the Test for Non-verbal Intelligence (Tr. 1021). The results of 
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (in which the subject matches 
a written word with one of four pictures illustrating its meaning) 
revealed he was at the level of a 4 year and two month old normal 
child (Tr. 1022) .The results of the Woodcock-Johnson test of 
cognitive abilities revealed he was at the level of a 4 year ten 
month old child (Tr. 1023). The Defendant's reading comprehension 
was tested and revealed a 3.8 grade level and his comprehension at 
a second grade level (Tr. 1023) . The doctor testified that the 
results were consistent with a learning disability (Tr. 1023, Def. 
Suppression Hearing Ex. 1). 
The doctor testified that the first one hundred words of the 
Miranda rights admonition form signed by the Defendant had a 
readability level of between 9th and 10th grade (Tr. 1025) . The 
doctor testified that she listened to the tape of the officer's 
interview and that the pauses between the rights were inadequate 
based upon the Defendant's ability to comprehend and that by the 
time the officer got to right number five, the Defendant could not 
recall the first right read (Tr. 1026). The doctor testified that 
the Defendant would not be able to comprehend the material on the 
rights admonition form if he read it (Tr. 1026-27). 
The trial court concluded that the Defendant's waiver was 
voluntarily and knowingly given. The entire text of the trial 
court's Ruling is attached as part of the Addendum (R. 258-65) . 
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B. The Law Applied to the Facts of the Case. 
There is no question that prior to a custodial interrogation 
of a defendant, he must be advised of his right to remain silent, 
the right to have an attorney, the right to appointed counsel in 
case of indigency and the right to suspend questioning any time to 
invoke the rights to silence or counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966). The validity of a waiver is determined by the 
totality of circumstances Moran v. Burbine. 475 U.S. 412, 421 
(1986) . The critical issue is whether Lavulavu gave a knowing, 
voluntary and an intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. Miranda, 
supra at 479. The Court must recognize a presumption against a 
waiver and the State's burden of establishing a valid waiver. 
United States v. Bernard, 795 F.2d 749, 752 (9th Cir. 1986), 
Mirandai supra at 475. 
The trial court, in its Ruling embodied the ruling in People 
v. Cheatham, 551 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1996) . The Defendant submits 
that Cheatham is far form dispositive and clearly distinguishable 
from the facts of this case. 
First, Cheatham is not binding upon this Court. The opinion is 
from the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan and, as such, may 
support a binding or persuasive decision but has no weight at all 
for the case being considered by this Court. Defendant submits as 
persuasive authority the case of Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 
305, (10th Cir. 1967). In that case, the Court of Appeals held as 
follows: 
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. . . Miranda is not a ritual of words to be recited by 
rote according to didactic niceties. What Miranda does 
require is meaningful advice to the unlettered and 
unlearned in language which he can comprehend and on 
which he can knowingly act . . . The crucial test is 
whether the words in the context used, considering the 
age, background and intelligence of the individual being 
interrogated, impart a clear, understandable warning of 
all of his rights. 
Coyote, 380 F.2d at 308; (Emphasis added) . See also Green v. United 
States, 386 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1967). 
The Tenth Circuit has taken a more recent look at the Miranda 
issue specifically regarding police interrogation of a non-English 
speaking suspect in United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493 (10th 
Cir. 1996) . In Hernandez, the Court reiterated traditional Miranda 
language. 
To establish a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, the 
government must show (1) that the waiver was voluntary in 
the sense that it was a product of free and deliberate 
choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception; 
and (2) that the waiver was made in full awareness of the 
nature of the right being waived and the consequences of 
waiving. Only of the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation shows both an uncoerced 
choice and the requisite level of comprehension can a 
waiver be effective. 
Hernandez, 93 F.3d at 1501. (Emphasis added). 
The Hernandez court held that "a translation of a suspect's 
Miranda rights need not be perfect if the defendant understands 
that he or she need not speak to the police, that any statement 
made may be used against him or her, that he or she has a right to 
an attorney, and that an attorney will be appointed if he or she 
cannot afford one." Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1501. The import of the 
Hernandez decision is that the suspect received the Miranda warning 
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in Spanish but the interpreter did not give a literal translation. 
Rather he gave one with poor grammatical content and the 
interpreter was not well trained. However, the defendant had 
completed one year of college and was Spanish-speaking receiving a 
Spanish admonition of rights. The Court held that perfection was 
not required if the substance of the warning was conveyed. In this 
case, no effort was made to Mirandize in Lavulavu's language. In 
this case there was no substance conveyed. The expert testimony--
which was uncontroverted--clearly indicated that the wording of the 
rights was at a 9th to 10th grade level and that the Defendant was 
at a 3rd to 4th grade level and simply was incapable of 
understanding the admonition. Based upon Hernandez and Coyote, both 
persuasive decisions, the admonition in this case was defective and 
Lavulavu's statements must be suppressed. 
Second, Cheatham is clearly distinguishable. In Cheatham, the 
defendant had an IQ of 62 but spoke English as a primary language. 
At the time of Miranda questioning, defendant was advised twice of 
his rights and gave two separate statements. At a suppression 
hearing, a defense psychologist offered an opinion that the 
defendant knew he didn't have to talk with police. Police officers 
testified that they read Miranda rights to the defendant, then 
during the second interview a second officer asked the defendant if 
he could read before they offered the rights admonition form to him 
to review. Upon learning the defendant could not read, the second 
officer read the rights admonition form a second time, pausing 
after each right to explain if necessary and to have defendant 
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place his initials next to each right to signify understanding and 
waiver. 
Contrary to Cheatham, in the case at hand, Lavulavu was the 
last of seven defendants interviewed. Police knew Lavulavu was 
Tongan, as were five of the six co-defendants. Police knew Lavulavu 
had only been in the country slightly more than a year. Police 
never inquired whether Lavulavu needed translation assistance. They 
read the rights quickly and secured an oral waiver then directed 
Lavulavu where to sign the form. Police never inquired whether 
Lavulavu could read at all and more specifically whether he could 
read English. The psychologist in the case gave a clear and 
unequivocal opinion that Lavulavu could not and did not understand 
that oral presentation of the rights waiver form and furthermore, 
Lavulavu could not and did not understand the form itself when 
presented with it to read and sign. 
Finally, the analysis in Cheatham supports Lavulavu's argument 
that suppression is the only appropriate outcome in light of the 
facts of this case. The Defendant respectfully submits that 
Cheatham should not even be considered since it is neither 
persuasive nor controlling but makes the following argument as a 
concession to the State's argument before the trial court. Cheatham 
adopts a two-prong approach, recognizing and incorporating a review 
of police action and review of the knowing and intelligent nature 
of a defendant's waiver. See Cheatham 551 N.W.2d at 365. The Court 
in Cheatham concluded that the confession at issue was voluntary 
and went on to review the knowing voluntary waiver. In the case at 
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hand, Lavulavu submits as a preliminary matter that any admission 
was not voluntary. Testimony adduced at the suppression hearing 
clearly set out the coercive elements. Defendant was arrested at 
approximately 1:10 a.m. on a Sunday morning. He was taken to the 
Orem Department of Public Safety where he was held until 
interrogated at approximately 6:50 a.m. He was not offered language 
assistance even though police officers were aware he was a Tongan 
national and had resided in this country only slightly more than a 
year. Police officers took advantage of Defendant's language 
disability in an effort to obtain a confession and without regard 
to their responsibilities to safeguard Defendant's constitution 
rights. Certainly, the police action was negligent at a minimum. 
See Cheatham 551 N.W.2d at 363. (The deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged 
in willfully, or at the very least negligent conduct which has 
deprived the Defendant of his rights. By refusing to admit evidence 
gained as a result of such conduct, the court hopes to instill in 
those particular officers, or in their future counterparts, a 
greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused). 
A simple inquiry of a foreign national as to whether he needs 
language assistance and an inquiry of anyone handed written 
material whether he can read and more specifically read English 
should be a prerequisite to any responsible interview unless it is 
the desire of the police agency to take advantage of an alleged 
suspectf s minority and language status. The absence of such inquiry 
is clear negligence and renders any admission involuntary. 
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Furthermore, Lavulavu was "directed" to sign the waiver, not 
requested as the police would have the Court believe. Detective 
Downey testified he read Lavulavu's rights to him. After all the 
rights had been read, he queried whether Lavulavu understood his 
rights to silence and to an attorney, then handed the form to 
Officer Barry Nielsen, a uniformed officer, with the direction. 
"Have him sign it here." Officer Nielsen pointed to a line where 
Lavulavu signed as directed. Such a circumstance is not voluntary, 
but coercive. 
Of course, if the Court finds that the waiver was not 
voluntary, the inquiry is over and any statements made should be 
suppressed. If the Court determines the waiver was voluntary, the 
second prong involves a determination of the knowledge and 
intelligence with which the waiver was given, a subjective analysis 
directed at the suspect's understanding and analyzed in light of 
the totality of the circumstances. 
The totality of the circumstances approach "permits--indeed, 
it mandates--inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation. This includes evaluation of the suspect's age, 
experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into 
whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, 
the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of 
those rights." Id. Dr. Lois Dettenmaier, the only expert presenting 
testimony, after examining the factors noted above determined that 
the Defendant could neither understand the rights when read to him 
nor could he understand the form when presented to him to read 
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himself. Moreover, Lavulavu could not understand individual 
abstract terms contained within the rights waiver form. She 
testified he could not even sound out coerce or threaten and when 
challenged to find an opposite (a method of determining 
understanding) of silence he could not offer one. She testified 
there was one word he could find an opposite for. To Leikina 
Lavulavu, the opposite of "right" was "left!" 
Consequently, Dr. Dettenmaier concluded that Lavulavu lacked 
the capacity to understand and therefore, unless unusual steps were 
taken, he could not understand. Testimony from both Detective 
Downey and Officer Nielsen confirm no special efforts were taken to 
compensate for the language or comprehension difficulties. 
Lavulavu was not offered an interpreter; Lavulavu was not 
asked if he could read English; the Miranda rights were read to him 
in rapid succession; there was no attempt made to explain. The 
totality of the circumstances clearly show that Lavulavufs 
statements were not the product of knowing an intelligent waiver 
and therefore, inadmissible. 
POINT V: THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE JURY'S VERDICT 
This Court, in evaluating a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence, views the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's verdict. State v. Vigh. 
supra? State V. BQQker, SUEra; State v. Lemons, supra. Verdicts are 
reversed only where reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he 
62 
was convicted. State v. Viah. suc^a; State V. LemQIl/ supra; State 
v. Johnson. supx^. 
The Defendant was convicted of Manslaughter in a School Zone, 
which requires a finding that the Defendant recklessly caused the 
death of Mr. Frietag or knowingly or intentionally caused his death 
under circumstances where the defendant reasonably believed the 
circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for his 
conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or 
excusable (R. 453, 412). 
The evidence in the case establishes that the Defendant did 
not really know Mr. Frietag. It was Beau Heaps that had the 
relationship with Mr. Frietag and his stepdaughter Susan Rice. The 
relationship between Frietag and Heaps was well documented during 
the trial. It is clear that the friction between Heaps and Frietag 
occurred when Mr. Frietag was away in July 1996 and his front door 
was broken during a party at which Heaps and not the Defendant was 
present. If fact prior to the phone calls to Mr. Frietag within 
days of the shooting, there was no connection between the Defendant 
and the victim. 
As it relates to the telephone calls, Ms. Heard's testimony is 
ambiguous at best. Only in the Defendant's statement is there an 
acknowledgment that the Defendant spoke to Mr. Frietag and during 
that conversation, Mr. Frietag told him to watch his back. 
The testimony regarding the Defendant's prior use of the gun 
to shoot at parked cars after a party by an individual clearly 
biased and drunk at the time was rebutted by the other passengers 
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in the car and officers who testified that no shootings at the time 
and place had been reported. 
On the night of the shooting, the Defendant was not an active 
participant in the events leading up to the trip to the Frietag 
residence or in trying to get the other defendants to participate. 
When the Defendant and his companions arrived at the Frietag 
residence, there is no dispute that Mr. Frietag had opened the door 
and was talking to one of the persons accompanying the Defendant to 
the scene. There is no question that something was observed in the 
hand of Mr. Frietag. It was in response to that observation, that 
the shots were fired. There is no question that .22 shells were 
found at the scene but no gun was located. There were 
irregularities in the police log as to person entering and exiting 
the Frietag residence after the shooting and Nancy Bollschweiler, 
who was romantically involved with Mr. Frietag and had a key to his 
apartment, was left alone in the apartment with the victim for a 
period of time. It simply makes no sense for Mr. Frietag to have 
the shells to a gun in his hand and no gun. The evidence suggests 
that Mr. Frietag had bragged about luring Heaps and his friend to 
the house and the reference to a bulletproof vest suggests that he 
was prepared for that encounter. The only reasonable conclusion is 
that in fact, Mr. Frietag had a gun that the companions of the 
Defendant observed and caused them to react. 
The Defendant and his companions testified that Mr. Frietag 
had a gun and that it was in response to that gun that the shots 
were fired. Under those circumstances, the Defendant had the right 
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to defend himself and others and use deadly force. At that 
juncture, the Defendant did not provoke the action, was not the 
aggressor and was not engaged in the commission of a felony. 
(R. 445). Only one shot was fired and that was in close proximity 
to the observation of the gun in Frietag's hand and the fear that 
Mr. Frietag was going to shoot. Mr. Frietag could have avoided the 
encounter almost at every juncture by not answering the door, 
closing the door after seeing the individuals and importantly, not 
holding a deadly weapon in his hand. The reasonable view of the 
evidence as marshaled herein in the Statement of Facts demonstrates 
that the Defendant had the right to defend himself in light of Mr. 
Frietagfs actions. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should reverse 
the verdict, judgment and sentence in this case and remand the 
matter with directions as to the admissibility of evidence and the 
statement of the Defendant as argued herein. 
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Exhibit 1 -- Utah Code Annotated 76-3-203.2 
(supp.1996) 
76-3-203.2 CRIMINAL CODE 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, 
Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-
1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19. 
Money Laundering and Currency Transaction Reporting 
Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 
76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but 
provides an enhanced penalty for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties 
under this section that the persons with whom the actor is 
alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, appre-
hended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those per-
sons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser 
offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall 
decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty under 
this section. The imposition of the penalty is contingent 
upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this section is 
applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall 
enter written findings of fact concerning the applicability 
of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of 
the sentence required under this section if the court: 
fa) finds that the interests of justice would be best 
served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the dis-
position on the record and in writing. ISM 
76-3-203.2. Definitions — Use of firearm in offenses 
committed on or about school premises — 
Enhanced penalt ies . 
(1) (a) "On or about school premises" as used in this section 
and Section 76-10-505.5 means any of the following: 
(i) in a public or private elementary, secondary, or 
on the grounds of any of those schools; 
\ii) in a public or private vocational school or 
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of 
those schools or institutions; 
(iiij in those portions of any building, park, sta-
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsec-
tions (l)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; and 
rv) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (l)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), 
and viv). 
(h) As used in this section: 
(i) "Educator" means any person who is employed 
by a public school district and who is required to hold 
a certificate issued by the State Board of Education in 
order to perform duties of employment. 
(ii) "Within the course of employment" means that 
an educator is providing services or engaging in 
conduct required by the educator** employer to per-
form the duties of employment. 
i2) Any person who, on or about school premises, commits 
*inv offense and uses or threatens to use a firearm in his 
possession in toe commission of the offense is subject to an 
enhanced degree of offense as provided in Subsection (4). 
(3) (a) Any person who commits an offense against an 
educator when the educator is acting within the course of 
employment is subject to an enhanced de«p"#v» of offense as 
provided in Subsection (4). 
(b> As used in Subsection (3>(a), "offense* means an 
offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against The 
Person; and 
(c) an offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3, j Q | 
bery. 
(4) The enhanced degree of offense for offenses comiatffl 
under this section are: 
(a) if the offense is otherwise a class B misdemeanor 
is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) if the offense is otherwise a class A misdemeandQI 
is a third degree felony; 
(c) if the offense is otherwise a third degree felony tffr 
a second degree felony; or 
(d) if the offense is otherwise a second degree felony it 
is a first degree felony. 
(5) The enhanced penalty for a first degree felony offensatf 
a convicted person: 
(a) shall be imprisonment for a term of not less than 
five years and which may be for life, and imposition's 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended u n W 
the court finds that the interests of justice would be b i t 
served and states the specific circumstances justifying t&r 
disposition on the record; and 
(b) shall be subject also to the firearm enhancement 
provided in Section 76-3-203 except for an offense con? 
mitted under Subsection (3) that does not involve.*' 
firearm. 
(6) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indict^  
ment is returned, shall provide notice upon the informs? 
tion or indictment that the defendant is subject to the 
enhanced degree of offense or penalty under Subsection1 
(4) or (5). The notice shall be in a clause separate from sad 
in addition to the substantive offense charged. 
(b) If the notice is not included initially, the court may" 
subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging 
documents to include the notice if the court finds the' 
charging document, including any statement of probable 
cause, provide notice to the defendant of the allegation he 
committed the offense on or about school premises, or if 
the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been 
substantially prejudiced by the omission. 
(7) In cases where an offense is enhanced by a degree 
pursuant to Subsection (4Xa), (b), (c), or (d), or under Subsec-
tion (5Xa) for an offense committed under Subsection (2) that 
does not involve a firearm, the convicted person shall not be 
subject also to the firearm enhancement contained in Section 
76-3-203. 1*4 
76-3-203.3. Penal ty for hate cr imes — Civil rights vio-
lation. 
As used in this section: 
(1) "Prima rv offense" means those offenses provided in 
Subsection (5). 
(2) A person who commits any primary offense with the 
intent to intimidate or terrorize another person or with* 
reason to believe that his action would intimidate or 
terrorize that person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) "Intimidate or terrorize" means an act which causes 
the person to fear for his physical safety or damages the 
property of that person or another. The act must be 
accompanied with the intent to cause a person to fear to 
freely exercise or enjoy any right secured by the Consti-
tution or laws of the state or by the Constitution or laws 
of the United States. 
(4) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an 
indictment is returned, shall provide notice on the 
complaint in misdemeanor cases that the defendant 
is subject to a third degree felony provided under thit 
section. The notice .shall he in a clause separate fron 
and in addition to the substantive offense charged. 
(b* If the notice is not included initially, the cour 
may subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend th» 
Tab 2 
Exhibit 2 -- Trial Court's Ruling on Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURr 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Fouri! j-;aicia District "Court 
of Utan bounty, State of Utah 
C A R M A i=> SMITH, Clerk 
"' LiA Deputy 





MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 961401295 
DATE: November 26, 1996 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Christine Gerhart 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having 
received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of and in opposition 
to the Motion, the Court denies the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum Decision 
and Order. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On August 25, 1996 at approximately i :06am, Orem dispatch received a call from a 
citizen who reported five or six dark complected males had parked a white sedan in front of 
his house at 395 E. 400 N. Orem, and were "bailing out." Based on their manner and the 
conversation he overheard, the citizen was afraid there was going to be a fight. 
2. Approximately two minutes later, another call was received from the same residence 
indicating shots had been fired. While on the line with dispatch, the caller saw the males get 
back in the car and leave westbound on 400 North. The caller reported that another person at 
the house had heard the males say "That mother fucker doesn't know who he's dealing with" 
prior to getting back into the vehicle. 
3. Officers were given as a description of the vehicle and the passengers, a "white 
passenger car" carrying five or six "dark-skinned males." 
•c. 05 
4. Officer Barry Nielsen was northbound on State Street, south of 400 North. He saw 
a car come from 400 North and turn northbound on State Street. He could not identify if the 
vehicle matched the description given by dispatch, so he followed it on State Street. When 
he passed 400 North, he looked eastbound and saw only one pair of headlights travelling 
westbound on 400 North towards State Street. 
5. As Officer Nielsen approached the vehicle northbound on State Street, he observed 
that it was a dark colored passenger car. In his rearview mirror, he saw the other car 
westbound on 400 North turn south on State Street and observed that it was a white passenger 
car. He turned his vehicle around and followed the car now southbound on State Street. 
6. Officer Nielsen continued to follow the white car as it turned westbound on Center 
Street. Prior to reaching 400 West, he was able to determine that there were several male 
occupants in the vehicle . He and other officers initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle at the 
intersection of Center Street and 400 West. 
7. The officers removed the occupants of the vehicle and placed them in handcuffs. 
The occupants were informed that an individual had been shot in the area they had just left 
and a car matching the description of their car was scene driving away. 
8. Officers Gordon Christensen and Eric Beveridge searched the vehicle and located a 
.38 caliber revolver from under the drivers' seat, which was where the Defendant was sitting 
when the vehicle was stopped. The officers also located a steak knife, tire iron, and BB gun 
in the vehicle. 
9. The seven occupants of the vehicle were taken to the Orem Police Department 
where they were read their Miranda rights and questioned by Officer Gary Downey. 
10. Prior to questioning the Defendant, Officer Downey read him his Miranda rights, 
pausing after each right and receiving acknowledgement from the Defendant before 
proceeding. The Defendant said he would waive his Miranda rights and make a statement to 
the police in the absence of an attorney. The Defendant was presented with a form outlining 
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each right and voluntarily signed the form, indicating he understood his rights and was 
voluntarily waiving them 
11. Officer Downey then interviewed the Defendant and, pursuant to the Defendant's 
consent, an audio tape of the interview was made. At no time during the interview did the 
Defendant indicate that he did not understand English or that he did not want to proceed with 
questioning in the absence of an attorney 
Opinion of the Court 
I. THE OFFICERS HAD A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO 
JUSTIFY STOPPING THE VEHICLE CONTAINING THE DEFENDANT. 
The Orem police offers' stop of the vehicle containing the Defendant is a level two 
stop as described by the Utah Supreme Court in State v Deitman, 739 P 2d 616, 617-618 
(Utah 1987) By initiating the traffic stop, the officers temporarily restrained the Defendants 
using a show of authority. A level two stop, and subsequent seizure of a person requires the 
seizing officer to have an "articulable suspicion" that the person being seized has committed, 
is committing, or will commit a crime. Id Whether an officer's basis for a seizure 
constitutes a reasonable or articulable suspicion is "determined by the totality of the 
circumstances in light of the officer's experience and training." State v Dorsev. 731 P.2d 
1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) 
After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop of the 
Defendant's vehicle, as well as the information available to the officers, the Court finds that 
the officers did have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the Defendant had committed a 
crime Orem dispatch received a call from a citizen saying a white car with five or six dark 
complected males had stopped in front of their house and based on the hour, and conversation 
the individuals were having, they suspected a crime would be committed. Within two 
minutes of this first call the citizen heard shots fired, saw the individuals return to their car, 
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and heard one of them say "That mother fucker doesn't know who he's dealing with " These 
facts taken together create a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed and that 
the individuals in the car are connected with the crime 
The officers gained visual contact with the Defendant's vehicle shortly after 
receiving the call from the citizen Officer Nielsen testified that as he pursued the other 
vehicle coming from 400 North, the Defendant's vehicle was the only other car coming from 
the suspect vehicle's last reported direction on 400 North As soon as Officer Nielsen realized 
the vehicle he was pursuing did not match the description of the suspect vehicle, he turned 
around and had visual contact with the Defendant's vehicle from the time it turned from 400 
North onto State Street until it was stopped at 400 West and Center Street The officers knew 
that this was the vehicle they were looking for because they had a physical description of the 
vehicle and its occupants from the citizen informant. Even though they did not personally 
receive the information from the citizen, information told to one officer is presumed to be 
available to all officers. 
In considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop of the 
Defendant's vehicle the Court considers the following: the close proximity in time of the 
calls received from the citizen informant and the officers' visual contact with the suspect 
vehicle, the physical description of the vehicle and its occupants, and the lack of any other 
traffic coming from the scene of the crime. Considered together and in light of the officers' 
training and experience, the Court finds the officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop the 
Defendant's vehicle and temporarily detain the occupants. 
II THE OFFICERS' WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE 
WAS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) acknowledged that a 
cursory search of a person without a warrant was within the parameters of the Constitution if 
••00' 026J 
the purpose of the search is to look for weapons. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) 
the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the Terry "stop and frisk" to include the search of 
the passenger compartment of the defendant's car even though the defendant did not have 
access to the car while the officers were talking to him. 
In this case, the officers were justified in searching both the occupants of the vehicle 
as well as the vehicle when they had only a reasonable suspicion that the occupants had 
committed a crime. The search of the Defendant's vehicle was not overly intrusive and the 
officers testified that the purpose of the search was for weapons because they were concerned 
for their safety. Such a concern is reasonable considering the crime the officers were 
attempting to investigate when they stopped the car was a shooting. The fact that the 
occupants were all handcuffed and had no access to the passenger compartment of the vehicle 
is not dispositive in light of Long. I 
The Court finds that the officers' warrantless search of the vehicle was within the 
scope of the Constitution and evidence obtained pursuant to the search is admissible at trial. 
I 
ID. THE DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD AND WAIVED HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS. 
In determining whether a criminal defendant properly waived his Miranda rights, the 
Court must consider if the "'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal 
both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension." People v. Cheatham. 
551 N.W. 2d 355, 361 (Mich. 1996) (quoting Moran v Burbine. 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 
In addressing the first prong of this test, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that "absent 
coercion, a confession could not be involuntary, and that a deficiency in the defendant that is 
not exploited by the police cannot vitiate the voluntariness of the confession." J& at 362 
(quoting Colorado v Connelly. 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986)). 
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In the case before the Court, the Defendant has not brought forth any evidence that 
the waiver of his Miranda rights or subsequent confession were coerced. Therefore, the Court 
finds that the first prong of the test is met and the Defendant's waiver was voluntary. 
The second prong of the Court's inquiry involves whether the Defendant's waiver 
was knowingly made. The Defendant claims that because he cannot read or write English, 
the waiver he signed was not knowingly made. However, it is not necessary for the 
Defendant to read, understand and sign a form such as the one provided to the Defendant by 
Officer Downey in order for Miranda rights to be properly given and waived. The form 
Officer Downey had the Defendant sign is merely a further assurance that the Defendant was 
informed of his rights and waived them. 
Officer Downey testified that he informed the Defendant of each right, including the 
right to remain silent, the right to have an attorney present, the right to have the Court 
appoint an attorney if he cannot afford one, and the admonition that any statements the 
Defendant makes will be used as evidence against him in court. Officer Downey also 
testified that he received acknowledgement from the Defendant after reading each of these 
rights. At this point, Officer Downey has fulfilled all of the constitutional and statutory 
requirements in allaying the inherent coercion the U.S. Supreme Court found inherent in 
custodial interrogation when it decided Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
The Court finds unpersuasive the Defendant's argument in the alternative that he 
could not comprehend spoken English enough to understand his rights as Officer Downey 
read them to him. The Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Cheatham, a case similar to 
the one now before the Court, stated that to "knowingly waive Miranda rights, a suspect need 
not understand the ramifications and consequences of choosing to waive or exercise the rights 
that the police have properly explained to him." 551 N.W. 2d 355, 367(1996). All that is 
required is that the defendant "know of his available options before deciding what he thinks 
best suits his particular situation." Id, 
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In support of his argument, the Defendant offered the testimony of Dr Dettenmaier, 
who stated that when she tested him on his knowledge of the words contained in the Miranda 
warning, he could not provide responses which she thought indicated understanding of the 
meaning of the words However, Dr Dettenmaier's tests did not attempt to determine the 
Defendant's understanding of the Miranda warning, only the words contained in the warning 
The Court thinks it is self-evident that the particular words in the warning gain much of their 
meaning in relation to the other words in the warning and in the context of the warning itself 
In addition, Dr Dettenmaier testified that repetition of words increased the 
Defendant's comprehension of their meaning In today's society, it is unlikely that any 
individual who has watched television will not have at least heard the language of the 
Miranda warning a number of times, so engrained in our society is the particular phraseology 
of the warning In addition, the Court notes that the Defendant is no stranger to the criminal 
justice system The Court thinks it is likely the Defendant had heard the Miranda warning 
prior to his interview with Officer Downey Relying on the testimony of Dr Dettenmaier that 
repetition increases comprehension, the Court finds that the Defendant had the requisite 
understanding of the Miranda warning to reach the threshold requirement of knowing what 
options are available to him before waiving the rights contained in the warning 
Other than Dr Dettenmaier's testimony, the Defendant offers no other evidence that 
he does not speak or understand English In the absence of any other evidence and after 
listening to the tape of the Defendant's confession, in which his responses to Officer 
Downey's questions were topical and responsive, the Court concludes that the Defendant did 
have a significant enough grasp of the English language to understand the warning given to 
him The Court also finds no indications of lack of comprehension of English that would 
have alerted Officer Downey that the Defendant would only understand the warning if it were 
delivered in Tongan 
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Having considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation 
and the Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights, as required by the U S Supreme Court m 
North Carolina v Butler 441 U S 369 (1979), the Court finds that the Defendant voluntarily 
and knowingly waived his Miranda rights Therefore, his confession is admissible and will 
not be suppressed at trial 
Order 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is herby denied 
DATED this 27th day of November, 1996 
cc Utah County Attorney 
Steven B Killpack, Esq 
Linda Anderson, Esq. 
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